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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Why States Should Tax the GILTI
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage
Corporate income taxes are a critical 
revenue source for both states and the federal 
government, yet they have been increasingly 
plagued by taxpayers’ use of tax-avoidance 
mechanisms for shifting profits to tax havens 
and to other (low-tax) foreign jurisdictions. This 
is perhaps the central problem of modern 
corporate tax administration.
The sweeping 2017 federal tax legislation 
attempted to deal with this problem in a 
number of ways.1 First, the federal corporate tax 
rate was reduced from 35 percent to 21 percent. 
Second, the corporate tax base was switched 
from being based on the worldwide income of 
U.S. corporate taxpayers to a territorial system 
in which the corporate taxpayers’ foreign 
income is potentially exempt from tax. Third, 
new antiabuse rules were implemented to 
combat profit shifting, the most important of 
which is the global intangible low-taxed income 
regime.
Without GILTI’s anti-profit-shifting rules, 
the switch to a territorial system for the U.S. 
corporate tax base would have turbocharged the 
incentives for taxpayers to engage in 
widespread profit-shifting tax avoidance 
transactions. The essence of how the GILTI rules 
work is by identifying foreign assets that are 
unusually profitable by means of a formula, 
then subjecting that income to U.S. tax even 
though the income is nominally earned abroad.2
These federal developments raise the 
question whether states should conform to 
federal tax law and bring this GILTI income into 
the state corporate income tax base. As a matter 
of tax policy, the answer is clearly yes.3
Some Preliminaries
We will discuss how states should approach 
GILTI on the assumption that the federal 
formula is, at least in part, successful. This is a 
reasonable assumption. First, we agree with 
what we take to be the consensus view that 
income shifting by multinational corporations is 
Darien Shanske is a professor at the 
University of California, Davis, School of Law 
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of 
law at Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors argue that states should 
conform to federal tax law and bring global 
intangible low-taxed income into the state 
corporate income tax base.
1
For discussion, see David Kamin et al., “The Games They Will Play: 
Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation,” 
103 Minn. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming) at 39-61.
2
For elaboration, see id.; and Daniel Shaviro, “The New Non-
Territorial U.S. International Tax System, Part 2,” Tax Notes, July 9, 2018, 
p. 171.
3
We do not write on an empty slate here. For similar analyses that we 
found helpful, see in particular: Lee A. Sheppard, “Is Taxing GILTI 
Constitutional?” State Tax Notes, July 30, 2018, p. 439; and Michael 
Mazerov, “Legislators: Don’t Feel Guilty About Taxing GILTI” (Nov. 17, 
2018).
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a substantial — and growing — phenomenon.4 
Second, we agree that absent effective antiabuse 
rules, the federal move to a territorial system 
would have dramatically increased the 
incentives for U.S. corporate taxpayers to try to 
shift their income abroad. Third, in identifying 
the scope of the problem and the income 
shifted, we agree that it is useful to look for 
anomalies. For example, there are many 
jurisdictions where U.S. corporations report 
profits that constitute multiples of that 
jurisdiction’s GDP;5 it is clearly impossible that 
the reported income was actually earned in that 
jurisdiction in a real sense. Another — and 
related anomaly — is that assets and people in 
some jurisdictions seem to produce gigantic 
amounts of reported income relative to similar 
assets in other jurisdictions.6 Of course, workers 
in these jurisdictions are not really more 
profitable; the excess profitability is just an 
artifact of income shifting.
Again, as a result of the 2017 federal tax 
legislation, the U.S. is no longer even trying to tax 
corporations on their worldwide income. GILTI is 
therefore an attempt to counter an increased 
incentive to shift income, and it does so by 
applying the reasonable notion that excessive 
profitability indicates shifted income.
It must be noted, however, that GILTI was not 
carefully crafted and much remains unknown as 
to how well it will actually operate in practice. 
Notably, certain prominent commentators, such 
as the Congressional Budget Office,7 do not expect 
it to be very effective. One issue is that the deemed 
normal rate of return is pretty high.8 Others have 
argued that many non-income-shifting taxpayers 
will be saddled with large amounts of GILTI 
because of the way GILTI calculates the asset base 
on which a taxpayer is permitted a normal return.9 
This might be so, though we would be surprised 
if, even over the short run, taxpayers did not find 
ways to increase their foreign asset base or engage 
in other maneuvers to reduce their GILTI.10
In any case, our point is not to evaluate GILTI 
as a matter of federal tax policy, but only to 
explain at a basic level what GILTI reasonably 
tries to do and likely will accomplish to at least 
some extent.
State Tax Policy From 20,000 Feet
In evaluating state tax policy options, we 
think it particularly important to start with 
opportunity-cost analysis. States operate under 
balanced budget constraints11 and typically rely 
on three tax bases: personal income tax, corporate 
income tax, and the retail sales tax. Thus, the 
question whether to conform to GILTI is a 
question about (1) whether the cost of conformity 
is worth it given what the state will do with the 
money, and (2) whether raising revenue through 
GILTI conformity is appealing relative to the use 
of some other revenue instrument. Generally, 
GILTI conformity is appealing for several reasons:
1. Though states’ needs vary greatly, we 
have little difficulty identifying significant 
needs on the revenue side. State revenues 
are cyclical, but spending needs are 
4
Jane G. Gravelle, “Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit 
Shifting: Carrots or Sticks?” (Apr. 26, 2016) (“While the magnitude of 
corporate profit shifting by U.S. multinationals into low or no tax 
countries is uncertain, there is overwhelming evidence of its existence 
and its increase in recent years.”).
5
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, “American Corporations 
Tell IRS That 61 Percent of Their Offshore Profits Are in 10 Tax Havens” 
(Nov. 5, 2017).
6
Thomas R. Tørsløv, Ludvig S.  Wier, and Gabriel Zucman, “The 
Missing Profits of Nations” at 19. (“Foreign firms in tax havens are an 
order of magnitude more profitable than local firms, while foreign firms 
in other countries are less profitable than local firms. That is, there is a 
clear trace in global macro data of movements of profits within divisions 
of multinational groups, away from high-tax affiliates and towards low-
tax affiliates.”).
7
Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 
2018 to 2028,” at 124, 127 (Apr. 2018). See also Kimberly A. Clausing, 
“Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (Oct. 29, 
2018).
8
Rebecca Kysar, ”Critiquing (and Repairing) the New International 
Tax Regime,” 128 Yale L. J. Forum 339 (2018). Other issues include the 
ability to apply foreign tax credits across jurisdictions. Id. States do not 
offer credits, but to the extent the provision of credits at the federal level 
makes GILTI less effective at combating income stripping, then the states 
will suffer.
9
See, for example, Joseph X. Donovan et al., “State Taxation of GILTI: 
Policy and Constitutional Ramifications,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 22, 2018, 
p. 315.
10
Richard Rubin, “Qualcomm Tax Move Will Save Firm $570 
Million,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 30, 2019. It appears that Qualcomm 
has moved to do its foreign business through branches, rather than 
CFCs, to avoid GILTI and BEAT — and to take advantage of FDII. Note 
that this strategy could increase Qualcomm’s state corporate income tax 
liability depending on how these changes interact with its water’s-edge 
election. See also Mitchell Goldberg and Bryan Appel, “Sometimes GILTI 
Is a Pleasure,” Law360, Jan. 31, 2019 (additional thoughts on tax planning 
to reduce tax liability in a GILTI world).
11
For discussion, see David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget 
Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Calif. L. Rev. 749 
(2010).
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counter-cyclical — so simply taking 
revenue raised by GILTI conformity and 
using it to shore up state reserve funds 
would be money well spent.
2. As an administrative matter, the primary 
benefit from conformity is that it is easy. 
To be sure, as we will discuss in a 
forthcoming essay, taxing GILTI at the 
state level does implicate apportionment 
issues, but we do not believe those need to 
create significant new compliance 
burdens.
3. As a distributive matter, taxing GILTI is 
relatively progressive. The incidence of the 
corporate income tax is a longstanding 
mystery, much less the incidence of GILTI, 
but some portion of the tax is borne by 
shareholders. Thus, conforming to GILTI 
makes state taxes more progressive when 
state tax systems are relatively regressive 
at a moment of rising income inequality.
4. At its core, GILTI is a base-broadening 
provision. Raising additional revenue by 
broadening the base is, ceteris paribus, 
more efficient than increasing taxes. Even 
if a state had no interest in new revenue or 
making its tax system more progressive, it 
would still benefit from pairing 
conformity to GILTI with a reduction in its 
corporate income tax rates.
Into the Weeds With GILTI
States have been struggling with the 
disproportionate erosion of their corporate tax 
bases for a long time.12 Indeed, there is a 
compelling argument that the answer that some 
states arrived at by the 1980s — mandatory 
worldwide combination with formulary 
apportionment — remains the best available 
option for both U.S. states and national 
governments.13 The benefit of this system is that it 
does not matter where a unitary business says 
that it earns income; the income will be 
apportioned to a jurisdiction based on some 
reasonable metric. This system represents the 
opposite of the current regime. Under mandatory 
worldwide combination, the assumption is that 
assets earn about the same rate of return wherever 
located, a much more reasonable (if imperfect) 
surmise than the current system that — as noted 
— must countenance that there are super assets in 
particular super jurisdictions.
Regrettably, in a story that has been amply 
explained elsewhere,14 the U.S. government, 
under pressure from foreign governments, 
pressured states to abandon worldwide 
combination. Moreover, federal tax policy has 
further encouraged erosion of the shared federal 
and state corporate tax bases in a number of ways, 
including: (1) instituting the check-the-box 
regulations, which undermined subpart F (a 
Kennedy-era attempt to curb income stripping),15 
and (2) providing and proposing repatriation 
holidays, which have further encouraged income 
shifting.16 Thus, the federal government has 
forced states to abandon their best tool to counter 
profit shifting while simultaneously exacerbating 
the profit-shifting problem.
This is the story that has brought us to GILTI, 
which we consider to be a serious, if partially 
flawed, attempt by the federal government to 
counter a problem that federal tax policy was 
otherwise going to make dramatically worse by 
shifting to a territorial system for the corporate tax 
base. In other words, more than 30 years after 
claiming it intended to help states counter profit 
shifting to make up for the loss of worldwide 
combination,17 the federal government has finally 
— if not exactly deliberately — made good on this 
12
See Mazerov, supra note 3.
13
See Jerome R. Hellerstein, “Federal Income Taxation of 
Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting With Formulary 
Apportionment,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 23, 1993, p. 407; and Darien 
Shanske, “White Paper on Eliminating the Water’s Edge Election and 
Moving to Mandatory Worldwide Combined Reporting,” State Tax 
Notes, Sept. 17, 2018, p. 1181.
14
See Hellerstein, supra note 13.
15
Lawrence Lokken, “Whatever Happened to Subpart F? U.S. CFC 
Legislation After the Check-the-Box Regulations,” 7(186) Fla. Tax Rev. 
(2005). Note that the check-the-box regulations were apparently the 
weapon used by Qualcomm to reduce its tax liability under the GILTI 
regime.
16
Lisa De Simone, Joseph D. Piotroski, and Rimmy E. Tomy, 
“Repatriation Taxes and Foreign Cash Holdings: The Impact of 
Anticipated Tax Reform” (Dec. 7, 2017).
17
The second principle on which there was agreement of the 
Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group was that there should be 
“increased federal administrative assistance and cooperation with the 
states to promote full taxpayer disclosure and accountability.” U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, “The Final Report of the Worldwide Unitary 
Taxation Working Group: Chairman’s Report and Supplemental Views,” 
at 9. Congress never passed the necessary legislation. Multistate Tax 
Commission, “Timeline of Events in the History of the MTC.”
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commitment. With this background, it seems clear 
to us that states should take this opportunity and, 
ideally, improve it.
The converse of conforming and getting at 
least some base expansion from GILTI is to suffer 
the further unmitigated erosion of the corporate 
tax base that the 2017 federal tax legislation would 
incentivize without GILTI. To go back to 
opportunity-cost analysis, this will mean that 
some other taxpayers or government programs 
will have to pay the price.
Conclusion
Of course, just because the states should (in our 
view) conform to GILTI does not mean that they can. 
Accordingly, we will present the legal analysis for 
how states can do so in a forthcoming essay.18 For 
now, we will conclude this essay with a short 
preview of that analysis. Modern dormant 
commerce clause jurisprudence — indeed, modern 
federal constitutional law more generally — puts a 
thumb on the scale when it comes to state power, 
particularly as to revenue-raising. It would be quite 
surprising, therefore, if the states were to be 
forbidden from conforming to a provision that 
reasonably — if imperfectly — shores up their 
ability to tax corporate income. 
18
If you can’t wait, see Shanske, “Once More on States and GILTI: 
States Should Conform to GILTI (And Why I Believe They Will 
(Eventually))” Medium.com (Dec. 27, 2018).
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